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BANKS AND BANKING-INSOLVENCY-CLAIzis-DEPoSITS.-GoNYER V.
WILLIAms, 143 PAc. (CAL.) 736.-Held, where a bank received on deposit
a check on another bank, and immediately placed the amount thereof to
the credit of the depositor, although the check was not presented to,
or paid by the drawee bank, until the next day, at which time the former
bank was insolvent, this crediting of the amount to the depositor made
the bank a general debtor, not a trustee to collect.
When the payee of a check endorses it to his bank for deposit, and
sends it to his bank and it is so credited, this made a complete negotia-
tion, with the right of the bank to charge back in case the check was not
paid. American T. & S. Bank v. Manufacturing Co., 150 Ill. 336.
But when the bank becomes a purchaser of the check, it is a debtor
and has no right to charge back. Taft v. National Bank, 172 Mass. 363;
Walton v. Riverside Bank, 6o N. Y. Supp. 519.
When a bank gives to one of its depositors credit on his pass book
for checks drawn on it by another of its depositors, having on its books
ample funds to pay them, such credit is equivalent to a payment in
cash. Bryan v. Bank, 205 Pa. 7. But if the funds are insufficient, it may
charge back the amount of the check. Ocean Park Bank v. Rogers, 92
Pac. (Cal.) 879; Contra. Addie v. National Bank, 45 N. Y. 735; Bank
v. Bank, 129 App. Div. (N. Y.) 540, 121 N. Y. Supp. 892.
But if the amount has never been credited on the books, though the
depositor was notified that it was, this does not amount to making the
bank a debtor. Bank v. Bank, 141 App. Div. (N.- Y.) 475; Nationzal
Gold Bank & Trust Co. v. McDonald, 5, Cal. 64, semble.
Checks deposited with a bank and credited in the depositor's pass
book are taken for collections and not for cash, whether the check is
drawn on the same bank or another. Bank v. McDonald, 51 Cal. 64;
Rapp v. Bank, 136 Pa. 426. Contra, Jaffee v. Weld, 132 N. Y. Supp. 505;
Lyons v. Bank, I35 N. Y. Supp. 121.
BILLS AND NOTES-HOLDER FOR VALuE-DEPoSIT CREDIT ENTRY.-WIL-
LIA'AsoN BANK & TRUST Co. V. MILEs, 169 S. W. (ARK.) 368.-Held,
that a bank purchasing a note in good faith, and giving the seller credit
on account, becomes thereby a bona fide holder for value, although no
draft or payment has been made against the credit.
The payment for deposited paper by transfer of credit to the account
of another at the order of the depositor is universally held to cut off
the equities of prior parties to the instrument. City Deposit Bank Co. v.
Green, i3o Iowa 384. The relinquishment of old security is sufficient
payment of value with reference to the paper substituted. Allentown
Nat. Bank v. Clay Product Supply Co., 217 Pa. 128. So long, however,
as the item of deposit merely stands as a credit entry without set-off
on the depositor's account, the bank is not, by the decisive weight of
American authority, a holder for value. First Nat. Bank v. McNairy, 122
Minn. 255; Nat. Bank v. Foley, 54 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 126; Queen
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City Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Reyburn, 163 Fed. 597. Nor is suf-
ficient value given if a depositor is permitted, merely as a favor, to draw
against an item deposited for collection. Fayette Nat. Bank v. Summers,
105 Va. 689. If, however, a regular deposit is once drawn upon before
notice of defects, the bank's position is not altered by the subsequent
restoration of the depositor's credit. Morrison v. Farmers' & Merchants'
Bank, 9 Okla. 697. These views have been incorporated into the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, Sections 25 and 191, limited by Section 54.
Binding undertakings, although executory, other than for the payment
of money, appear to be sufficient value. Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Church,
81 N. Y. :226; Brooklyn, etc. R. Co. v. Nat. Bank of the Republic, 102
U. S. 25; Currie et al. v. Misa, io L. R. Exch. Cas. 153. A very scanty
number of English and American authorities are in accord with the prin-
cipal case. Ex parte Richdale, i9 Ch. D. 4o9; Wheeler v. First Nat.
Bank of Battle Creek, 3 Tex. App. Civ. Cas., Sec. 153.
CARRiERs-LIAmLITIEs FOR INJURIES-OWNER OF ELEVATOR.-WILMARTH
V. PACInIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE Co. OF CALIFORNIA, 143 PAC. (CAL.)
78.-Dictumt: The responsibility of the owner of an elevator for injury
to a passenger is analogous to that of a common carrier.
That the circumstances surrounding the owner of an elevator and
the common carrier are analogous is evident when we consider that
the safety and lives of those who avail themselves of either of these
means of carriage must of necessity be intrusted -in a great measure
to the care of those who control and operate the cars. The law,
recognizing this analogy, places similar duties upon both.
A common carrier is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers.
Thorson v. Groton and S. St. Ry. Co., 85 Conn. 1i; Keeley v. City
Electric Ry. Co., 133 N. W. (Mich.) io85. But it is bound to exercise
the highest degree of care and diligence which is reasonably practicable
under the circumstances. Colorado Springs and Interurban Ry. Co. v.
Allen, 135 Pac. (Colo.) 790; Austin v. Washington Water Power Co.,
123 Pac. (Wash.) 775; Indianapolis Southern R. Co. v. Tucker, 98
N. E. (Ind.) 431.
One owning and controlling a building equipped with passenger ele-
vators is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers. Munsey v.
Webb, 37 App. D. C. 185; Tippecanoe Loan & Trust Co. v. Jester, IOI
N. E. (Ind.) 915. But he must exercise the highest skill and foresight
consistent with the efficient operation of the elevator. Putnam v. Pacific
Monthly Co., 136 Pac. (Ore.) 835; Cubbage v. Estate of Conrad Younger-
man, 134 N. W. (Iowa) lO74; Howard v. Scarritt Estate Co., 161 Mo.
App. 552.
The analogy drawn in the dictum of the principal case has been
definitely recognized in Grimmel v. Boyd, 142 N. W. (Neb.) 893, and
in Helmly v. Savannah Offlce Building Co., 79 S. E. (Ga. App.) 364
(construction of "common carrier" in a statute). (Seaver v. Bradley,
179 Mass. 329 is contra as to construction of a similar statute.) And
this is the prevailing doctrine. Cooley on Torts (Student's Ed.), 663,
and cases cited; Hutchinson on Carriers, Vol. I, page 94, and cases
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cited. In New York, Michigan, and Rhode Island, only ordinary or
reasonable care is required of elevator owners. Griffin v. Manice, 166
N. Y. 188; Burgess v. Stowe, 134 Mich. 204, 211; Edwards v. Manufac-
turers Bldg. Co., 27 R. I. 248.
CARRIERS-PASSENGER'S AcTIoN FOR INjURIES-BRDEN OF PRoOF-REs
IpSA LOQUITUR.-STEELE ET UX. V. PAcIFic ELECTRIC Ry. Co., 143 PAC.
(CAL.) 718.-When the fact is undisputed that an injury has occurred
to plaintiff while alighting from a street car, but the circumstances
attendant upon that injury are in question, held, it is error to charge
that, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, a presumption arises that
defendant was negligent..
"The principle expressed by the formula res ipsa loquitur-the thing
speaks for itself-is tha4, where the thing is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such
as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if proper care be
used, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by
defendant, that the accident arose from lack of proper care." Muskogee
Electric Traction Co. v. Mclntire, 37 Okla. 684; McNulty v. Ludwig &
Co., 153 App. Div. 2o6; The Joseph B. Thomas, 81 Fed. 578.
The instrument doing the damage must be under the control of the
defendant or his servants. Bonham v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co.,
179 Ill. App. 469.
A presumption of negligence is not raised; that is, evidence sufficient
to invoke this principle may not be sufficient to justify a directed verdict,
in absence of rebuttal by defendant; but it must be presented to the
jury and is sufficient to support an inference by the jury that the
defendant was negligent. Zahniser v. Penn. Torpedo Co., 19o Pa. St.
350; Heimberger v. Elliott Frog & Switch Co., 165 Ill. App. 316.
Mere proof of injury is not sufficient. The plaintiff must introduce
enough evidence concerning surrounding facts to justify jury in finding
that those facts raise an inference of negligence on defendant's part.
Burns v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 158 S. W. (Mo.) 394; Davis v.
Crisham, 213 Mass. 151.
Then the defendant has the burden of going forward. Huscher v.
New York & Queens Electric Lt. & Power Co., 158 App. Div. 422;
Stewart v. Carpet Co., 138 N. C. 6o. The inference sought to be raised
may be rebutted by defendant by disproving in any way the plaintiff's
allegations of negligence. Lellon v. Rawitzer, 57 Conn. 583; Bush v.
Barnett, 96 Cal. 202; Enright v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 165 Ill. App. 163.
But the burden of proof is not shifted. Heimberger v. Elliott Frog &
Switch Co., supra; Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233. And the plaintiff,
who has alleged negligence, must prove it and he must also prove that
damage proximately resulted from it. Riordan v. Chicago City Ry. Co.,
178 Ill. App. 323; Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 47o; Button v. Frink,
51 Conn. 342.
CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITY-GRouNDs OF RELIEF-GImcHRIST V. HATCH, iO6
N. E. (IND.) 694.-Held, although the parties to a transaction have con-
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curred in an illegal act, they are regarded as not equally guilty, where
one party has been induced to enter into the contract through fraud,
and under such circumstances equity will intervene to relieve against
the fraud when public good requires it. Plaintiff was induced to convey
realty and give note for stock, the value of which was misrepresented
by one of the defendants, who made an illegal agreement with plaintiff,
by which the latter was to be elected secretary and attorney of the
company. The other defendant participated in the fraud and received
the conveyance and note, crediting with them his co-defendant, who was
indebted to him.
An action cannot be maintained on an illegal contract where plaintiff
and defendant are equally culpable. Hanover Nat. Bank v. First Nat.
Bank, iog Fed. 42. But if the parties are not in pari delicto the party
taken advantage of may recover the money paid. Concord v. Delaney,
58 Me. 3o9. This was held to be so where the plaintiff 
paid money
to check prosecution of her husband by defendant. Woodharn v. Allen,
130 Cal. 194. In Kansas it has been held that one who 
makes a part
payment for liquor to be illegally sold is not in pari delicto and may
recover the sum paid. Stansfield v. Kunz, 62 Kans. 797. So where one
makes use of criminal process to overcome will of another. Gorringe
v. Read, 23 Utah 12o. But a bribe paid to the attorney of an adverse
litigant was held in New York to be not recoverable. Dake v. Patterson,
5 Hun. 558. Where, however, the party is induced by fraud 
to enter
into an illegal agreement, many courts allow a recovery, even when the
contract has been executed, if public policy is thereby advanced. Such
an illegal contract was set aside in Boyd v. De la Mon tagnie, 73 N. Y.
498; the defendant induced his wife to transfer property with intent to
defraud creditors, on his false representations that she was liable 
for
certain debts and would lose her property. This is similar to the prin-
cipal case and illustrates the general rule. Crossley v. Moore, 40 N. J. L.
27; Foley v. Greene, 14 R. I. 618; Harrington v. Grant, 54 
Vt. 236;
Green v. Corrigan, 87 Mo. 359; McBlair v. Gibbes, 17 How. 232.
CoNs ITUTIoNAL LAw-PoLiCE PowER-PuBLIC DISPLAY op RED FLAGS.-
CosmmoNwVEALTH v. KARWONEN, io6 N. E. (MASS.) 556.-Held, that an
act forbidding the display of red flags in parades, as inimical to public
order and morals, is a constitutional exercise of the police power.
The minute censorship of private conduct assumed by the statute
under consideration may be readily paralleled by other acts similarly
upheld. People v. Van De Carr, 91 App. Div. (N. Y.) 20 (mutilation of
national flag forbidden) ; Corn. v. Sherman Mfg. Co., i8g Mass. 76 (use
of great seal as trade-mark prohibited). Unquestionably the police
power extends to the prevention of practices merely indirectly menacing
to the public peace and order. State v. Boyd, 91 AtI. (N. J.) 586; Davis
v. Cont., 167 U. S. 43; Updegraph v. Com., ii Serg. & Rawl. (Pa.) 4o6;
People v. Most, 171 N. Y. 423. The act must have a tendency reasonably
conducive to its professed object. State v. Redinon, 134 Wis. 89. But
the mere fact that certain cases fall within the prohibition, which do not
fall within the scope of the justifying purpose, does not suffice to invalidate
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the statute. People v. McGuire, 113 App. Div. (N. Y.) 631; People v.
Ewer, 8 N. Y. Cr. Rep. 383; State v. Warren, 113 N. C. 683. When,
however, the provisions, though in a measure pertinent to the object,
are needlessly sweeping, extending palpably beyond the justifying pur-
pose, it is the prevailing judicial tendency to declare the statute void.
People v. Warden of N. Y. City Prison, i57 N. Y. 1I6 (ticket brokerage
forbidden,-professed object, prevention of fraudulent sales); People
v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377 (manufacture and sale of oleomargarine for-
bidden,-objec, the preventionof the fraudulent substitution for butter) ;
Weisner v. Village of Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91 (taxation condemned as
confiscation); People v. Green, 85 App. Div. (N. Y.) 400 (regulation of
billboards condemned as needlessly sweeping); R. R. Co. v. Husen, 95
U. S. 465 (prohibition of the importation of cattle, condemned as
extending beyond the necessities of quarantine). Under the literal con-
struction given to the Massachusetts statute, the holding of the principal
case seems to deviate from, as its opinion clearly ignores, the judicial
tendency last mentioned.
CONTRIBUTION-JOINT TORT-FEAsORS-NEGLIGENCE-FURBECK v. GEouRTZ
& SoN, 143 PAC. (ORE.) 654-Held, where a personal injury was not
caused intentionally, a right of contribution exists between the persons
whose negligence caused the injury.
The general rule is that there is no contribution between joint wrong-
doers. Merryweather v. Nixon, 8 Term Reports 186. But this general
doctrine has been limited in its scope by the courts so that the rule is
held not to apply where the party seeking contribution was a tort-feasor
only by inference of law. Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455. To deprive
one of the right of contribution, the wrongful act must have been
inalum in se. Buskirk v. Sanders, 73 S. E. (W. Va.) 973. The rule
applies only to cases where the parties who claim contribution have
engaged together in doing knowingly or wantonly a wrong. Acheson. v.
Miller, 2 Oh. St. 2o3. The test of recovery is whether the plaintiff at
the time of the commission of the act for which he has been compelled
to pay, knew that such act was wrongful. Torpy v. Johnson, 43 Neb.
882. Where attachment creditors attached the supposed goods of their
debtor which they honestly believed had been fraudulently transferred
to a third party, contribution for this trespass was allowed. Parwell v.
Baker, 129 Ill. 261; Vandiver & Co. v. Pollak, io7 Ala. 547. In cases
of joint negligence, the weight of authority seems to be opposed to the
principal case. One, whose negligent act, in concurrence with a separate
and distinct negligent act of another, has been the proximate cause of
an injury, for which he has been compelled to pay, cannot recover by
way of contribution from the other tort-feasor. City of Louisville v.
Louisville R3. Co., 156 Ky. I4I; Central Ry. Co. v. Macon Ry. & Light
Co., 9 Ga. App. 628; Spalding v. Adm'r of Oakes, 42 Vt. 343. There are
cases, however, which support the view of the principal case that the rule
disallowing contribution between joint wrong-doers has no application
to torts which are the result of unintentional negligence. Mayberry v.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., iOO Minn. 79; Armstrong County v. Clarion
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County, 66 Pa. St. 218. On principle there would seem to be no reason
why the equitable doctrine of contribution should not apply where there
has been joint unintentional negligence.
EQUITY-AINULIMENT OF MARRIAGE-PERSONS ENTITLED TO SUE.-EWALD
v. EwALD, io6 N. E. (MASS.) 567.-Held, Petitioner, in an action for
annulment of marriage, resting her case upon the allegation that she
acted with the deliberate intention of evading the laws of the common-
wealth in which she was and has continued to be a resident, and making
such wrongful conduct the ground for reliefsdid not come into the court
with clean hands and would be left in the position in which she had
placed herself.
There are few American authorities directly in point. It is well settled
that where a party innocently marries in violation of the law of the
domicile, equity will grant relief. Fuller v. Fuller, 33 Kans. 582. In
England the rule is that relief will be given even though the plaintiff
intended to violate the law. Andrews v. Ross, 14 P. D. 15; Miles v.
Chilton, I Rob. Ecc. 684. In I Bishop on Marriage and Divorce, (4th
ed., § 3oo) it is stated that fraud on the part of the plaintiff is no
defence in a suit to procure a declaration of nullity ab initio by reason
of pre-contract. Sumnerlin v. Livingston, 15 La. Ann. 519, held that
where the representatives of a deceased wife sued the husband to obtain
her share of the joint property, that he was not estopped to set up
his own turpitude as a defence. The court remarked that he could not
have availed himself of his wrong-doing as a basis for a demand. This
dictum is in accord with the principal case, which is supported by Rooney
v. Rooney, 54 N. J. Eq. 231, and Kerrison v. Kerrison, 6o How. Prac.
(N. Y.) 51. Marshall v. Marshall, 2 Hun. (N. Y.) 238, was similar to
the principal case in its facts and in that case a contrary rule was
adopted, the court, Daniels, J., dissenting, following the English rule.
FRAUD-JUDGMENTS-MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-HINES v. BRODE, 143 PAC.
(CAL.) 72.-Held, In an action for fraud in the sale of land, the measure
of damages is the difference between the actual value of the property
and its value if as represented, plus depreciation in the value of improve-
ments made by purchaser, resulting from the fact that the land was
not as represented.
Where fraud has been practiced in the sale of land, the defrauded
party may rescind the contract or he may affirm it and recover damages
for the fraud. Rice v. Oli", 79 Pa. 391.
Concerning the measure of these damages there are two lines of cases
(both allow for improvements made under the supposition that the repre-
sentations were true). The first, recognized in some thirty States,
allows the plaintiff to recover the difference between the value as repre-
sented and the actual value at the time of sale (that is, the difference
between what the vendee bargained for and what he got). Smith v.
Appleton, 155 App. Div. 520; Chapman v. Bible, 137 N. W. (Mich.) 533;
Hicks v. Deemer, 187 Ill. 164; Linerode v. Rassmussen, 63 Oh. St. 545.
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The second allows him to recover the price paid minus the actual value
at the time of sale (that is, the difference between what the vendee
gave and what he received). Chandler v. Andrews, 192 Fed. 543; Peek v.
Derry, 37 Ch. Div. 541; Rice v. Olin, supra; Nelson v. Gjestrum, 136
N. W. (Minn.) 858. This is the rule in equity. Ryan v. Miller, 139
S. W. (Mo.) 128.
The arguments advanced for the first rule are that, if the second
is followed, the defrauder could speculate on the outcome P)f his
fraudulent enterprise without possibility of loss. Stoke v. Converse,
153 Iowa 274. And any advantage lawfully secured to the innocent pur-
chaser in the original bargain inures to the benefit of the wrong-doer.
Morse v. Hutchins, io2 Mass. 439. For the second rule it is claimed
that the action is one in tort for fraud and that the defendant must
make good the plaintiff's losses proximately resulting from the fraud,
which include the excess paid over the value of the land, and reasonable
expenditures made in reliance on defendant's representations, but not
the expected fruits of an unrealized speculation. Smith v. Bolles, 132
U. S. 125. Also, persons would go around seeking to be duped, so that
they might recover for advantageous bargains. Nelson v. Giestrum,
supra.
Still a third measure of damages was recognized in Pruitt v. Jones, 14
Tex. Civ. App. 84, where it was held to be the difference between the
purchase price and a sum which bears the same proportion to that pur-
chase price as the actual value of the land bears to the value if it
had been as represented, but this case stands alone.
It would seem that the second is the best rule.
NEGLIGENCE-IMPuTED NEGLIGENcE-NEGLIGENCE OF PARENT.-DENVER
Crry TRAmWAY Co. v. BROWN, 143 PAc. (CoLo.) 364.-Held, the negligence
of the parents of a child of tender years cannot be imputed to the child
to defeat a recovery by the child for injuries from the negligence of a
third party.
The doctrine of imputed negligence has no application where the infant
is of sufficient age and capacity to exercise discretion in his own behalf.
In such case, it is only his own contributory negligence which will bar
a recovery. Louisville R. Co. v. Sears, ii Ind. App. 654; Lafferty v.
Third Ave. R. Co., 85 App. Div. 592. It is everywhere conceded that
when the parent brings an action to recover for damages resulting from
the loss of the child's services, the parent's contributory negligence is a
bar to the action. Feldman v. Detroit United Railway, 162 Mich. 486;
Davis v. R. R. Co., 136 N. C. 115; Philips v. Denver Co., 53 Colo. 458.
Not all courts, however, agree that if the negligent parent is the real
beneficiary there can be no recovery for death of the child. Norfolk &
Western R. Co. v. Grosclose's Adm'r., 88 Va. 267; Wym ore v. Mahaska
County, 78 Iowa 396. The leading case that is opposed to the holding in
the principal case is Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend. 615, which established
the so-called New York rule which is still adhered to within that jurisdic-
tion and a few other states. Pastore v. Livingston, 131 N. Y. Supp. 971;
Leslie v. Lewiston, 62 Me. 468; Casey v. Smith, 152 Mass. 294. The theory
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of the New York rule is that the parent is the agent of the child and for
that reason imputes the negligence of the parent to the child. But any
such theory of agency must rest, not on fact but on a pure fiction of law.
To construct such an agency here does the child an injustice and does
not accord with the usual solicitude and protection with which the law
favors infants. The principal case is in accord with reason and the
weight of authority.
NEGLIGENcE-VIoLATION OF STATUTE OR ORDINANCE---"NEGLIGENCE PER
SE."-BEAER V. MASON, EHRMAN & Co., 143 PAC. (ORE.) xooo.-Under a
statute forbidding the employment of persons under eighteen years of
age in the operation of elevators, held, that a violation of such statute
constitutes "negligence per se," and the employer is liable, as a matter
of law, for a death resulting from such unlawful employment.
This doctrine, in so far as recognized at all, applies only to regula-
tions protective either of persons or property. Zimnm erman v. Baur, ii
Ind. App. 607. Its operation is limited to the benefit of those persons
or things which the regulation is designed to protect. Gay v. Essex
Electric St. R. Co., 159 Mass. 238 (case of trespasser); Woodruff v.
Bowen, 136 Ind. 431; Williams v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 155 Ill. 491.
No conflict arises when the act expressly awards damages to the party
injured by the breach. Kelley v. Anderson, 15 S. Dak. iO7. By the
preponderance of authority the same effect is given in the absence of
such a provision. Smith v. Milwaukee Builders' and Traders' Exchange,
91 Wis. 36o; Karle v. R. R. Co., 55 Mo. 476; Queen '. Dayton Coal &
Iron Co., 95 Tenn. 458; Osborne v. VanDyke, 113 Iowa 557. Identical
in effect, though not in language, are numerous cases allowing a recovery
as a matter of law, without raising the question of negligence. Wilby
v. Mulledy, 78 N. Y. 31o; Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R. I. 199. If, however,
a qui tam penalty is provided, this is construed to exclude the action
on the case. Brattleboro v. Wait, 44 Vt. 459. When a regulation is
intended for the protection of the general public, a few cases illogically
refuse the remedy to an individual member of the general public spec-
ially damaged. Taylor v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 45 Mich. 74. An
important line of authorities treat the violation of a statute or ordinance
as constituting merely a prima facie case of negligence. U. S. Brewing
Co. v. Stoltenberg, 113 Ill. App. 435. Others regard it as merely com-
petent and important evidence. Knupfle v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 84
N. Y. 488. In the majority of these cases the courts are not called
upon to go farther than this in behalf of the plaintiff. Carrigan v. Still-
well, 97 Me. 247; Siddall v. Jansen, 168 Ill. 43. In one state the breach
of law is merely competent corroborative evidence. Foote v. Amnerican
Product Co., 195 Pa. St. i9o. Under these views there is apparently no
liability if the defendant was, without fault, destitute of the means of
performance. Weise v. Tate, 45 Ill. App. 626. Or if a reasonably prudent
man would have disregarded the regulation under the circumstances.
Riegert v. Thackery, 212 Pa. St. 86. All of these doctrines obviously
apply equally to the question of contributory negligence of a plaintiff.
McCambley v. Staten I., etc., Co., 32 App. Div. (N. Y.) 346.
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PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS or AGENT-
EFFECT OF PROVISIONS OF CONTRACT.-COLONIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
v. BRAGDON, io6 N. E. (MASS.) 633.-Held, fraudulent representations
by a vendor's agent concerning land did not vitiate a contract for the
sale thereof, when the contract expressly provided that no agent had
authority to make any representation or agreement not contained in the
contract.
The fraudulent representations of an agent made in the course of
the business of his principal bind the principal. Teters v. Hinders, ig
Ind. 93. The vendor of land is responsible for material misrepresenta-
tions made by his agent, though unauthorized and the agent did not
have actual knowledge whether the representations were true or false.
Bennett v. Judson, 21 N. Y. 238. An innocent vendor is not liable in an
action of deceit brought for the fraudulent representations of his agent.
Decker v. Fredericks, 47 N. J. L. 469. Of course where an agent makes
false representations with intent to defraud the purchaser, an action
for deceit will lie against him by the vendee. Hidden v. Griffin, 136
Mass. 229. The representations of an agent are not binding upon his
principal unless they were made at the time of the contract and con-
stituted a part of the res gestae. Cate v. Blodgett, 7o N. H. 316. Where
a seller's agent misrepresents to a purchaser the meaning of ambiguous
words used in the contract of sale, the purchaser may rescind the con-
tract though it contained a stipulation that no other representations than
those therein printed would be binding on the principal. Barrie v.
Miller, 104 Ga. 312. Where a contract of sale declared that only agree-
ments contained in the contract were binding, representations of the
agent of the seller not included in the contract were of no effect.
Bruner v. Kansas Moline Plow Co., 7 Ind. T. 506; Cook v. Whitfield,
41 Miss. 541. A provision in a contract procured by the agent of the
seller, that the seller will not be held responsible for any agreement
not expressed in the contract in writing, does not relieve him from
liability for the fraudulent representations of his agent within the scope
of his apparent authority. Smith v. Hildenbrand, 36 N. Y. Supp. 485.
This last case cited must be deemed wrong on principle because the
doctrine of ostensible authority can have no application where the
authority of the agent is expressed in the instrument signed by the
vendee. The principal case is in accord with the weight of authority.
PLEADING-SUIT TO RECOVER FOR WORK DONE.-HENNESSY V. PRESTON,
io6 N. E. (MASS.) 57o.-Held, where a contractor sues, in debt or its
equivalent, for the contract price, alleging in general terms complete
performance, he cannot recover on proof of substantial performance,
which is less than complete performance. His remedy is in special
assumpsit.
Before the common counts can be used, all conditions required by
law must be fulfilled; i. e., all express and implied conditions must be
fulfilled. Carroll County v. Collins, 63 Va. 302; Independent Order of
Mutual Aid v. Paine, 17 Ill. App. 572; Expanded Metal Co. v. Boyce,
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233 Ili. 284. But in bills and notes, under an allegation of performance,
plaintiff may show anything that will excuse performance. Spann v.
Baltzell, I Fla. 301; Norton v. Lewis, 2 Conn. 478; Williams v. Cowen,
3 Cowen, 252. And there is a tendency to apply the bills and notes
rule to insurance cases. German Is. Co. v. Gumert, 112 Ill. 68; Levy v.
Ins. Co., I0 W. Va. 56o. When the express contract states no more
than the law will imply, the common counts may be used. Davis v. Smith,
79 Me. 351; Pitkin v. Frink, 8 Met. 12; Gibbs v. Bryant, i Pick. 118.
The majority of courts hold that substantial performance is sufficient,
if it is done in good faith. Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648; Jones v.
Davenport, 74 Conn. 418. The better rule seems to be that when the
plaintiff has substantially performed, he can recover under the common
counts. Peltier v. Sewall, 12 Wend. 386; Nolan v. Whitney, 88 N. Y. 648.
